Institute of Legal and Management Studies

The Supreme Court recently held that the period of limitation for offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,1940, punishable with 3 years imprisonment, has to be calculated from the date of publishing of the government analyst's report.

The bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta was hearing the challenge to the order of the Kerala High Court, which allowed the continuation of proceedings against the appellant under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, holding the complaints to be within the period of limitation.

On 29.01.2010, the Drug Inspector collected samples of two batches of Rabeprazole Tablets from City Medicals, Kozhikode, Kerala. The drug was manufactured by Indica Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd., whose directors are the appellants.

A sealed sample of the drug was tested in a Government Laboratory, and reports dated 30.03.2010 and 09.04.2010 found it to be of sub-standard quality, failing the 'Related Substances and Assay' test.

Subsequently, the Drug Inspector filed two complaints (CC 1/2014 and CC 2/2014) under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, alleging violation of Section 18(a)(i), punishable under Section 27(d). Charges were framed against the appellants accordingly.

The appellants filed two Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions seeking dismissal of proceedings, arguing that cognisance was barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC. They contended that since the drug samples were collected in January 2010 and reports obtained by April 2010, but the complaints were filed only in June and July 2013, after three years, thus making the proceedings time-barred.

Both the Trial Court and High Court held that there was no delay in initiating the proceedings, as the period for giving notice of prosecution and obtaining the details of the accused had to be excluded.

The present bench observed that under Section 468(2) CrPC, offences punishable with more than one year but up to three years have a three-year limitation period. Since Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act prescribes a three-year punishment for manufacturing or distributing sub-standard drugs, complaints must be filed within three years. As per Section 469(a) CrPC, this limitation period starts from the date of the offence.

Applying the law to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the date of offence has to be calculated from the time. The bench observed :

"As is the nature of this case, an offence would be made out only after the report of the Drug Analyst is received. As the Drug Analyst report in the present case was received on 30.03.2010 and 09.04.2010, therefore, the limitation period by virtue of Section 469(a) of CrPC shall commence from that respective date when the said reports when received. The complaint is filed by the Respondents only on 24.06.2013 and 03.07.2013, which is beyond the statutory time limit."

The Court further rejected the reasoning given by the High Court and Trial Court. The bench reasoned that the Government Analyst's reports dated 30.03.2010 and 09.04.2010 marked the start of the limitation period, it expired in March and April 2013.

It added that these reports already contained all necessary details of the manufacturing company, which were also forwarded to the company in 2010. Hence, the claim that more than three years were needed to gather particulars is baseless. The courts' reasoning was flawed, as the principle of limitation requires vigilance. Moreover, the complainant never sought condonation or exclusion of delay in filing the complaint.

"The evidence on record clearly states that the requisites such as the details of the manufacturing company required for initiating proceedings under the 1940 Act are present in the Government Analyst Report in Form-13 which was received by the respondent on the above-mentioned dates. The same was even forwarded to the manufacturing company on 06.04.2010 and 24.11.2010. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the complainants were well aware about the particulars of the company from the very beginning."

It further held that " the spirit of the law on limitation lies in the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Law helps the vigilant, not the indolent."

Additionally, the Court noted that the complainant has not raised any plea requesting either condonation of delay or exclusion of time before the Court, explaining the delay in filing the complaint. It held that "Both the Courts below have exceeded their power in awarding a benefit that was never claimed by the respondents."

The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal allowed.

For Petitioner(s): Mr. Abid Ali Beeran P, AOR; Mr. Sarath S Janardanan, Adv.; Mr. Anand Thumbayil, Adv.; Mr. Sriram P, Adv.; Ms. Namita Kumari, Adv.; Ms. Vishnupriya P Govind, Adv.

For Respondent(s): Mr. P.V. Surendranath, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR; Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv.; Mrs. Ashly Harshad, Adv.; Mr. Sawan Kumar Shukla, Adv.

Case Details : MITESHBHAI J. PATEL AND ANR. v. THE DRUG INSPECTOR AND ANR.| @SLP(CRL.) NO(S). 3662-3663/2024

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 822

Click here to read the order