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26 May 2025, 03:56 PM
The Supreme Court dismissed appeals against Allahabad High Court judgments holding that the Air Force School in Bamrauli, Allahabad, is not a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, and writ petitions against it by its employees are not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
A bench of Justice Abhay S Oka, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanatullah(dissenting) and Justice Augustine George Masih passed the judgment in two civil appeals filed by teachers challenging adverse employment decisions.
“A finding of fact was recorded that there is no material to show that the Government or the IAF has any control over the management of the school. It is not possible for us to take a contrary view. 24. In the circumstances, we are unable to find any fault with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court. The relationship between the appellants and the said school is in the realm of private contract. Assuming that there was a breach of private contract, the same does not involve any public law element”, the Court held.
While Justice Oka authored the majority opinion dismissing the appeals, Justice Amanullah dissented, holding that the school was amenable to writ jurisdiction and the Indian Air Force (IAF) has deep and pervasive control on it.
The dispute involved two separate cases. In both the cases, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petitions holding that the school does not fall into the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus, they filed the present appeals.
The appellants argued that the Air Force Schools were established by the IAF and managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act. They pointed to the affiliation application to the CBSE which claimed the school was fully financed by the IAF, construction of school buildings using public funds, and issuance of pay scales by the Air Force Directorate of Education. They said that IAF has functional and administrative control over the Society and the school.
They contended that this amounted to deep and pervasive control by the IAF over the school's administration, satisfying the tests laid down in precedent for determining whether a body is a “State” under Article 12. Reliance was placed on rulings including Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, and Andi Mukta Sadguru v. VR Rudani.
Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati contended that Air Force Schools are governed by Non-Public Funds contributed voluntarily by IAF personnel. No funds are allocated from the Consolidated Fund of India, nor does the government exercise administrative control. The school functions independently of statutory regulation, and its staff are employed contractually under private arrangements.
The Union of India relied on Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma and St. Mary's Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, where private unaided educational institutions were held not to be “State” under Article 12 even when performing public functions such as imparting education.
Court's Verdict
Majority Opinion by Justice Abhay S. Oka with Justice Augustine George Masih concurring:
Justice Oka highlighted that the Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, which manages the school, is a non-profit welfare association and the school itself is a non-public fund school. Its finances are derived primarily from student fees collected under various heads, and contributions made by Air Force personnel through their welfare funds.
The Court found no evidence of control by either the Central Government or the Ministry of Defence over the school's functioning or administration. Though some IAF officers serve ex-officio on its governing committees, the school is not governed by statutory rules, the Court noted. The School Managing Committee, not the IAF or a statutory body, exercised day-to-day control over the school.
The Court noted that the 1985 CBSE affiliation application claimed the school was “fully financed by the IAF.” However, the Court noted that there was no evidence that the school actually received funds from the IAF. Even if the school was built with public funds, there was no evidence of recurring government grants or statutory control.
The Court noted that while the school may follow pay scales prescribed by the IAF Directorate of Education, it did not amount to pervasive control by the IAF over the functioning of the schools. Further, the Education Code followed by the school was not a statutory instrument. Therefore, even if the Code regulated staff appointments, pay, and service conditions, it was not legally binding in the way statutory rules are.
Citing St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, the Court concluded that even if the school performs public functions, that alone is not sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 12. The relationship between the teachers and the school was contractual in nature involving no public law element, not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, Justice Oka held. The Court dismissed the appeals.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah:
Justice Amanullah disagreed with the majority opinion, holding that the Air Force School was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. He observed that the school was founded by the Indian Air Force as a welfare initiative, and was administered by School Management Committees composed of serving IAF officers who exercised authority over critical functions such as recruitment, pay fixation, probation, disciplinary proceedings, and termination. He concluded that the IAF exercised dominant administrative and financial control over the school.
“The undersigning of these day-to-day orders compels us to hold that the control exercised by the IAF, and by extension the Government of India, on the working of the School is not merely regulatory in nature but deep and pervasive inasmuch as it is not only concerned with supervision alone, but even involved in the banal and mundane workings/proceedings of the School”, he said.
Justice Amanullah noted that imparting education is a recognized public function. Since the school served children of both IAF and non-IAF families and operated under government-like administrative control, its operations directly affected public interest. Therefore, any action taken by the school, especially regarding teachers, was intertwined with the discharge of a public duty, he said.
Justice Amanullah rejected the claim that the school was run purely on “non-public funds.” He relied on a 1985 CBSE affiliation application where the school declared it was “fully financed by the Air Force”, and Air Force Orders permitting annual grants from public welfare funds and mandating construction of school buildings using funds authorized by the Ministry of Defence on defence land. He emphasized that even the so-called “non-public funds” were welfare contributions facilitated, overseen, or exempted by the Government of India and thus bore a public character.
“In the aforesaid background, we find that for all practical purposes, in every sphere of activity relating to the School, the funding consists substantially of funds which are ultimately traceable to the public exchequer.”
Relying on Pradeep Kumar Biswas, the Justice Amanullah held that the IAF's control over the school was “deep and pervasive control.”
He stressed that the teachers were not mere employees of a private body but the “vital cog” in fulfilling the school's public duty to impart education. Hence, any action affecting them was connected to the public function of imparting education, he said.
Justice Amanatullah underscored the extensive reach of the IAF into the school's affairs. Officers from the IAF were involved even in selecting principals and conducting interviews, sometimes allegedly favouring relatives. He cited this as further proof that the school was not insulated from official influence. Justice Amanullah found that the appellants' removal involved a public law element and could not be relegated to a mere private contractual dispute.
“the School has been established primarily to impart education which is a 'public function'. This, juxtaposed with the dominant and all-pervasive control exercised on the School, through the Committee by serving officers of the IAF, is enough to bring the Committee and the School within the extraordinary and prerogative writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution”, he concluded.
Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah observed that the Board of Governors of the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society and the School Managing Committee are predominantly composed of serving IAF officers, who hold their positions ex officio. This establishes that the IAF is institutionally and officially involved in the management of the schools, he said.
He emphasized that even when such entities are formally independent, decisions are made by government officials acting in their official capacity, not private capacity. He concluded that the Society and the Committee do not operate independently of government control but are instead subject to the IAF's deep, pervasive, and effective oversight.
Conclusion
The Court ultimately ruled 2:1 in favor of the respondents, holding that the Air Force School in Bamrauli is not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution, and hence its employees cannot maintain writ petitions under Article 226 for employment-related grievances.
Case no. – Civil Appeal No. 10899 of 2013
Case Title – Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Ors.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629